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Is All Campaigning Equally Positive? The Impact of District Level 





A significant comparative literature suggests that campaigning efforts by political parties 
impact positively, both in terms of mobilization and turnout. However, effects are not 
uniform. They may be affected by the electoral system used, the electoral circumstances 
and effectiveness of party management. Studies of district-level constituency 
campaigning in Britain have identified two important trends. First, that effective targeting 
is a core component of a successful district campaign strategy in terms of delivering 
electoral payoffs and that, over time, political parties have become better at targeting 
resources where they are needed most. While improvements in targeting have helped 
ensure that all three principal parties’ campaigns have tended to deliver electoral payoffs, 
a question has arisen as to whether increasingly ruthless partisan targeting by parties 
could have detrimental effects on overall levels of turnout. Second, they have shown how 
campaign techniques are continuously being modernised but that, despite these 
changes, just as in other democracies, more traditional labour-intensive campaigning 
tends to produce stronger electoral payoffs. This article therefore considers three 
questions in respect of the impact of district level campaigns on turnout: whether the 
combined campaign efforts of the three principal parties in Britain are associated with 
higher levels of turnout; whether the different campaigning styles of parties affect levels 
of turnout equally; and whether the campaigning efforts of different parties have 
differential effects on turnout and whether intense partisan targeting does indeed impact 
upon turnout overall. It shows that while campaigning boosts turnout, the impact varies 
by campaign technique and by party, as a function not only of targeting but also of 
electoral context.  
 
  
                                                          
1
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Is All Campaigning Equally Positive? The Impact of District Level 
Campaigning on Voter Turnout at the 2010 British General Election 
 
Introduction 
A significant comparative literature suggests campaigning efforts by political parties impact 
positively, both in terms of mobilization and turnout. The most detailed studies suggest that 
campaigning efforts at local (most commonly, district) level are particularly effective, with 
voters responding positively to contact. This is shown in experimental studies (see, for 
example, Gerber & Green, 2000), large-scale comparative analyses based on survey 
responses (see, for example, Karp, Banducci & Bowler, 2007), and several individual 
country studies (see, for example, Hillygus, 2005; Marsh, 2004, Carty & Eagles, 1999), 
particularly in Britain, where a variety of indicators, both at the individual and aggregate 
levels, has been employed, demonstrating  that more intense campaigning activity at district 
level delivers electoral payoffs for parties (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart & Whiteley, 2004, 2009; 
Whiteley & Seyd, 1994; Whiteley, Clarke, Sanders & Stewart, 2013; Johnston, 1987; Pattie, 
Johnston & Fieldhouse, 1995; Denver & Hands, 1997; Denver, Hands, Fisher & McAllister, 
2003; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2009; Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a; Johnston and Pattie, 
2014).  
 
However, these effects are not uniform. In comparative analyses, Karp et al (2007) show 
that effects may be mediated by the electoral system used. They find that campaigning in 
candidate-based systems is more likely to mobilize voters than in party-based systems. 
Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse (2011a) further show that the impact of campaign effects will vary 
over time within the same candidate-based system as a function of the marginality of an 
election, the likelihood of significant change in the composition of government, the number of 
seats targeted by individual parties, and the effectiveness of the central management of 
district level campaigns. This is mediated significantly by the popularity of parties and 
whether or not they are part of the incumbent government. From the parties’ perspective, 
there are clear electoral benefits to be had from campaigning intensively in the places where 
their efforts are most likely to yield payoffs. What is perhaps less clear is the impact of these 
campaigns on turnout. We might expect that more intense campaigning will boost turnout 
overall, mobilizing voters wherever campaigning takes place. However, this becomes a 
particularly interesting question under the ‘first past the post’ or single member plurality 
electoral system used for Westminster elections as the logic of district level campaigning is 
that parties should rationally focus their efforts principally in those seats where they can 
reasonably expect to deliver electoral payoffs. As Karp et al (2007: 92) predict: ‘parties will 
expend greater effort on mobilizing voters when the expected benefits of turning out voters 
are greatest, relative to cost.’ And this is broadly what occurs, although this does not imply 
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that citizens in safe seats are completely ignored. Indeed, Karp et al (2007: 102) find that 
levels of party contact in safe seats in countries with single member districts still exceed 
those in countries utilizing a system of proportional representation. Notwithstanding, parties 
in Britain generally campaign most in their target seats (those that they are seeking to 
defend or capture), somewhat less in those seats that they comfortably hold and even less in 
those seats where there is no realistic chance of victory (Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a; 
Johnston and Pattie, 2014). The realization in the rational distribution of parties’ campaign 
efforts varies somewhat, with the Conservatives generally being less successful, but over 
time all three parties that contest seats in Britain have moved towards this kind of distribution 
of effort.  
 
While this is true for campaign strength overall, intensity in differing campaigning styles may 
not be distributed so effectively. Broadly speaking, we can identify three approaches to 
constituency campaigning: traditional, modern and e-campaigning. Traditional campaigning 
is labour intensive, including doorstep canvassing, ‘knocking up’ of voters on polling day, 
and the distribution of leaflets and posters. Modern campaigning includes the use of 
computers, telephones and direct mail to contact voters. E–campaigning focusses upon 
contacting voters through social media, email and text message. Fisher & Denver (2009) 
show that modern campaign efforts are more likely to be distributed effectively compared 
with traditional ones, which depend to an extent on the mobility of party volunteers between 
seats and also on the human, financial and other resources available locally. Slightly 
different patterns are, however, associated with forms of e-campaigning, where 
differentiation of campaign effort by the electoral status of the seat is much less pronounced 
(Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse 2011b). 
 
Notwithstanding, the overall result, as predicted, is that the most intense activity where two 
or more parties are targeting their efforts takes place in only around 160 seats of the current 
632 in Great Britain. As a consequence, we might expect that as the parties become better 
at focussing their campaign efforts in order to deliver electoral payoffs (which includes 
raising funds locally for some of the activities), then overall levels of turnout may be 
differentially affected as most seats are not subject to intense competition and the positive 
effects of voter mobilization. Equally, we may find that different parties’ campaigns have a 
differential impact on turnout, reflecting their relative success at distributing campaigning 
resources effectively to maximize electoral payoffs. Previous detailed analyses on these 
topics (such as Denver & Hands, 1997) are, however, relatively brief, with the vast majority 
of studies not differentiating by party. In this article, therefore we address three questions 
using data from the 2010 British General Election. First, we consider whether the combined 
campaign efforts of the three principal parties in Britain at constituency level are associated 
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with higher levels of turnout. Second, we examine whether the different campaigning styles 
of parties affect levels of turnout equally. Finally, we examine whether the campaigning 
efforts of different parties have differential effects on turnout and whether intense partisan 
targeting does indeed impact upon turnout. 
 
Data Sources 
The data used to capture campaign effort in these analyses are twofold. First, we use a 
survey of electoral agents2 carried out immediately after the 2010 election, designed to 
capture the many different aspects of campaigns: preparation, organisation, manpower, use 
of computers, polling day activity, use of telephones, use of direct mail, canvassing, use of 
leaflets and e-campaigning. Campaign intensity indexes are calculated using a Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) of all these core indicators of constituency campaigning as 
defined theoretically (see Appendix for variables included in each index). 3  Using 
conventional cut-off criteria, the PCAs suggest one factor is sufficient to represent the 
variance in the original variables (Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a: 827). The survey 
delivers the most comprehensive and accurate indicator of campaign intensity. However, 
despite good response rates overall (54%), there are data gaps when requiring responses 
from all three main parties in the same seat. Analyses are carried out on those seats where 
data are available for all three parties but, of course, this produces the possibility of selection 
bias.  
 
As a check, therefore, we also employ a second data source as a surrogate for campaign 
intensity: candidate spending.4 The analysis of candidate spending is not constrained by 
response rates. Declaration of spending is required by law and the returns are published by 
the Electoral Commission. Thus, near complete spending data are available for almost all 
candidates. Candidate spending does not, however, capture free volunteer effort which, as 
Fisher et al (2014) show, can have significant independent effects. But, it is a useful 
surrogate with which to confirm results from the agent survey where analyses are limited by 
case availability. Indeed spending in previous elections has been shown to be highly 
correlated with other indicators of overall campaign intensity (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2009), 
though in 2010 the correlation was less strong (Fisher et al, 2014). In addition, candidate 
                                                          
2  All candidates are legally obliged to retain an election agent. The agent is responsible for the organisation and conduct of 
the campaign. This survey is sent to election agents of all candidates in Great Britain from the Conservative Party, the 
Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party standing for election to the Westminster 
Parliament. 
3 Where there were missing data on individual variables that formed part of these scales, multiple imputation was used, 
which took account of the individual party and the target status of the seat. 
4  Candidate spending in Britain is limited by law and that limit varies by the electorate and geography of the constituency. 
Thus, the appropriate measurement of candidate spending is not the total expenditure, but the percentage of the 
maximum permitted. The analyses in this article exclude the 18 Northern Ireland constituencies plus that being defended 
by the Speaker (where the parties traditionally do not field candidates) and Thirsk & Malton, where the election was held 
later (under different spending limits) because of the death of a candidate during the short campaign period. 
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spending data at the 2010 election offered a more detailed picture than in previous elections 
due to an extended regulated period of four months. In previous elections, data were only 
available for the regulated period between dissolution and the election (or, prior to the 
Political Parties, Elections & Referendums Act 2000, from the point at which a candidate was 
adopted). The Political Parties and Elections Act 2009, however, extended the regulated 
period. The period from dissolution to polling day remained regulated and was known as the 
‘Short Campaign’. In addition, the period from January 1st 2010 to dissolution was now also 
regulated – known as the ‘Long Campaign’ (see Johnston et al, 2011 for details). To capture 
as full a picture of campaign intensity represented by candidate spending as possible, 
therefore, we use the candidates’ proportion of the maximum permitted expenditure in their 
constituencies over both regulated periods (‘Long’ and ‘Short’), thus capturing costed activity 
over a period of four months prior to the election. 
 
The Impact of Combined Levels of Campaigning on Turnout 
Our first question asks whether the combined campaign efforts of all three parties had a 
positive effect on turnout in the local constituency. We model this using OLS with percentage 
turnout for each constituency in 2010 as the dependent variable. Our preferred control 
variable is turnout at the previous election. While turnout does not correlate across 
constituencies between elections as strongly as party performance, its use does at least 
capture the many demographic factors that may contribute to higher or lower levels of 
electoral performance. However, previous turnout may also be a proxy for previous 
campaigns. There is a potential danger, therefore of ‘over-controlling’ in our estimates. 
Notwithstanding, the employment of turnout at the previous election provides a conservative 
estimate of the marginal effect of the campaign, over and above any previous campaigns. Its 
use in this election, however, presents some complication; there were extensive boundary 
changes between the 2005 and 2010 general elections in England and Wales, though not in 
Scotland.5 As a result, there are no directly comparable turnout data available. There are, 
however, notional turnout data which, while not perfect, do represent a useful test of the 
robust nature of our results.6  
 
We examine the impact of campaigning on turnout with two separate tests. The first uses 
constituencies where we have campaign intensity scores for all three parties. Inevitably, this 
results in a restriction on the number of cases, and we are limited to 102. The second test 
uses candidate spending as a surrogate variable. This provides data in 619 of the 630 total 
cases.  
 
                                                          
5
  The analyses in the article refer only to Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) 
6
  We are grateful to Professor Colin Rallings for supplying the notional turnout data for the 2005 general election 
Page | 6  
 
The results for both tests are shown in Table 1 and, despite the different numbers of cases, 
the results are very similar.7  The combined campaign intensity and candidate spending 
models have a positive and statistically significant effect on turnout. Thus, there is a good 
overall case that campaigning produces positive benefits not only for the parties themselves 
but also for the health of the elections. By and large, the more campaigning the parties 
engage in overall, the more voters in general are mobilized. Unfortunately, over time, the 
parties have confined their intensive campaigning (as measured by candidate spending) to a 
smaller number of constituencies, in many of which they are spending less than two decades 
earlier (Johnston and Pattie, 2014). 
 
 
Table 1. The Impact of the Combined Campaigns on Turnout  
 All Three Parties (Intensity) All Three Parties (Spend) 
 B  S.E.  Sig  B  S.E.  Sig  
       
Constant 33.303 4.284 ** 22.295 1.303 ** 
Campaign Intensity  .561 .233 * .017 .003 ** 
Notional Turnout 2005  .543 .068 ** .680 .022 ** 
Adj. R
2 
   .399   .647 
n    102    619  
 
** p <0.01 * p <0.05 
 
The Impact of Campaigning Styles on Turnout 
Our measure of campaign intensity captures a whole range of techniques employed by 
parties and provides the best representation of party effort. Inevitably, campaign techniques 
evolve over time as new technologies become available (and, critically, affordable) and local 
parties adjust to varying levels of available volunteer effort (Fisher & Denver, 2009). An 
indicator of such a change is reflected in the constituency campaigning literature. The 1992 
election was, for example, dubbed ‘the fax election’ by Denver and Hands (1997). The notion 
of the fax being the pinnacle of technology seems faintly comical today, but illustrates that 
over a relatively brief period of time the emphasis in campaign techniques does change. 
Fisher & Denver (2008) show this has occurred for all parties; the 2001 election was the 
‘tipping point’ when more modern campaign techniques using telephones and targeted direct 
mail became more prevalent than traditional labour-intensive techniques such as doorstep 
canvassing and hand-delivered leaflets. By 2010, parties increasingly deployed e-
campaigning, reflecting the wider availability and accessibility of such technology (Fisher, 
Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011b). 
 
                                                          
7  For this model and all others, we also ran the models using two aggregate level demographic variables as an alternative to 
notional turnout in 2005: the percentage of owner occupiers in the constituency and the population density (measured by 
the number of persons per hectare). These variables have consistently been useful aggregate level predictors of turnout 
and were also employed by Denver and Hands (1997) in their initial examination of the impact of district level campaigning 
on turnout at the 1992 British General Election. The results (available on request from the lead author) were almost 
identical to the better specified model using notional turnout as a control.  
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As new campaign styles develop, which campaign styles are most effective at influencing 
electoral outcomes? Comparative evidence suggests that more traditional forms of labour-
intensive campaigning still have the stronger impact. Gerber & Green (2000:661), for 
example, found that face-to-face campaigning was more likely to stimulate turnout than 
direct mail (see also Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009), while Aldrich et al (2013) argue that in 
general face-to-face is more likely to yield payoffs. Similarly, there is strong evidence in 
Britain of greater voter responsiveness to more traditional doorstep campaigning   (Fisher & 
Denver, 2009, Fisher, 2011, Fisher et al, 2014; Pattie & Johnston, 2003). However, the 
intensity of use of different techniques is intertwined. Thus, evidence from Britain shows that 
parties that run extensive campaigns based on traditional methods also tend to adopt 
extensive ‘modern’ approaches such as telephone canvassing and direct mail. E-campaigns 
are slightly different, with less discrimination in the level of their use depending on the seat’s 
strategic importance, a function both of the relative low cost of the technology and parties’ 
lower prioritization of these techniques (Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011b).  
 
Overall, this presents some challenges in measuring the differential impacts of differing 
campaign styles relative to each other on turnout, since no campaign will rely exclusively on 
one approach and inevitably there is some ‘leakage’ of effects from other campaigning 
styles, making it difficult, if not impossible, to completely isolate individual effects. This can 
be partly mitigated if models are run separately rather than including traditional, modern and 
e-campaigning all in the same model. As with the overall measure of campaign intensity, we 
capture the differing campaign styles through a Principal Components Analysis of a series of 
items. The scores for each party are combined to produce an overall score of intensity for 
these three approaches. 8 As with the analysis of overall campaign intensity in Table 1, we 
model the impact on percentage turnout in 2010 using OLS, while controlling for notional 
turnout in 2005 (Table 2). Three models are run for each campaign style using seats where 
we have scores for all three parties. All analyses have the potential risk of selection bias 
though, as Table 1 suggests, this may not be a particular problem. 
 
Analyses of constituencies where there are scores for all three parties show that the 
combined levels of both traditional and modern modes of campaigning are associated with 
higher levels of turnout whereas e-campaigning, while positively signed, has no statistically 
significant effect (Table 2). This may be partly explained by the relative lack of targeting 
employed in e-campaigning (Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011b), but also suggests that in 
Britain, at least, e-campaigning has some way to go before it has a major impact on electoral 
outcomes (see also Gibson and Cantijoch, 2011). As Fisher et al (2014) show, despite the 
                                                          
8  Details of the variables used to create the indexes of traditional campaigning, modern campaigning and e-campaigning  
are shown in the Appendix 
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growth in campaigning styles that incur cost, the more traditional approaches conducted by 
free, volunteer labour still have a greater propensity to deliver electoral impact.  
 
Table 2. The Impact of Campaigning Styles on Turnout  
 E-Campaigning Traditional Campaigning Modern Campaigning 
 B  S.E.  Sig  B  S.E.  Sig  B  S.E.  Sig  
          
Constant 33.425 4.380 ** 32.118 4.344 ** 33.236 4.325 ** 
E-Campaigning  .297 .244 n.s. n/a   n/a   
Traditional Campaigning  n/a   .479 .230 * n/a   
Modern Campaigning  n/a   n/a   .450 .230 * 
Notional Turnout 2005 .539 .070 ** .563 .070 ** .545 .069 ** 
Adj. R
2 
   .373   .402   .387 
n  
 
  102    102    102  
 
** p <0.01 * p <0.05 
 
 
The Impact of Individual Parties’ Campaigns on Turnout 
Our third question examines the impact of individual parties’ campaigns on turnout. As Table 
1 showed, campaigning overall is associated with higher turnout, but is this true for all 
parties – particularly as some are more effective at targeting their efforts than others? A 
party that was ruthless in focussing partisan effort on target seats could theoretically depress 
turnout overall since, inevitably, most seats will not be targeted and therefore fewer voters 
will be exposed to the mobilizing effects of intense campaigns. We examine this question 
first by running the model using only those seats where we have campaign intensity scores 
for all three parties (Table 3). We run two versions of the model: the first without a control 
variable, the second using notional turnout in 2005 as a control. Since most demographic 
predictors of turnout are also associated with parties’ own electoral fortunes it makes sense 
to run both models and compare results.  
 
The first results offer interesting findings. In both models, Conservative campaign intensity is 
associated with higher levels of turnout. Liberal Democrat campaigning has a similarly 
positive effect in the second model. The results for Labour, however, are more intriguing. In 
both models, Labour campaigning is associated with lower levels of turnout to a statistically 
significant degree.  
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Table 3. The Impact of Separate Parties’ Campaigns on Turnout Using Campaign Intensity 
 
 Without Controls With Notional Turnout 2005 
 B  S.E.  Sig  B  S.E.  Sig  
 
Constant  66.041 .534 ** 38.382 4.131 ** 
Conservative  1.173 .528 ** 1.284 .444 ** 
Labour  -1.743 .484 ** -.966 .488 * 
Lib Dems  .848 .507 n.s. .834 .420 * 
Notional Turnout 2005 N/A   .450 .067 ** 
Adj. R
2 
   .253   .486 
n    102    102 
 
** p <0.01 * p <0.05 
 
The analyses in Table 3 are based only on a limited number of constituencies, again raising 
the possibility of selection bias. Thus, Table 4 repeats Table 3’s analyses but using the 
surrogate measure of candidate spending. The findings produced with the limited number of 
cases in Table 3 are broadly replicated. Both Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
campaigning is associated with higher levels of turnout, but not campaigning by Labour 
candidates which, as in Table 3,  is associated with lower levels of turnout. Where no 
controls are used, this finding is statistically significant. When controlling for previous 
notional turnout, the coefficient is negatively signed, but fails to reach statistical significance. 
This suggests that, at best, Labour campaigning had no positive impact on turnout. 
 
Table 4. The Impact of Separate Parties’ Campaigns on Turnout Using Candidate Spending 
 
 Without Controls With Notional Turnout 2005 
 B  S.E.  Sig  B  S.E.  Sig  
 
Constant  62.443 .400  **  25.222 1.425 ** 
Conservative  .101  008  **  .037 .006 ** 
Labour  -.062  .009  **  -.010 .007 n.s. 
Lib Dems  .025  .008  **  .016 .006 ** 
Notional Turnout 2005 N/A   .632 .024 ** 
Adj. R
2 
   .265    .658 
n    619    619 
 
** p <0.01 * p <0.05 
 
Overall, both tests, despite the limitations of the available cases for the preferred measure of 
campaigning and the employment of a surrogate measure, tell a very similar story. First, 
these tests, and those in Table 1, show that more intense constituency campaigning was 
associated with higher levels of turnout at the 2010 general election. Second, this positive 
impact was shared at the individual party level by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. 
Third, Labour campaigning apparently either depressed turnout at the 2010 general election 
or at least had no significant effect upon it, raising the obvious question why Labour’s 
campaigns should have differential effects on turnout compared with the other two parties.  
 
One possible explanation returns to the impact of partisan targeting which represents 
entirely rational party behaviour in a first-past-the-post system. The logic is straightforward – 
Page | 10  
 
a rational party should focus its campaigning resources principally on those seats it needs to 
win to achieve its overall electoral goals. There is clear, comparative evidence for such a 
prediction. Karp et al (2007: 98-9) show, for example, that parties in general are consistently 
more likely to target voters in marginal districts than in safe ones. If we disaggregate 
targeting effects by party, analyses of the 2010 election in terms of measuring the impact of 
campaigning on electoral payoffs suggested that Labour’s targeting was most effective in 
terms of delivering payoffs, that the Conservatives’ was improved relative to previous 
elections, and the Liberal Democrats targeted less effectively than in previous elections 
(Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a). Thus, if partisan targeting is effective, we would expect 
the positive impact of campaigning on overall turnout to be diminished. Equally, if partisan 
targeting is less effective, then the positive benefits of campaigning on turnout are likely to 
be apparent across a larger number of districts. 
 
We test whether parties’ targeting efforts impact upon turnout in Table 5 using candidate 
spending data to maximise the number of cases, and using interaction terms of campaign 
efforts in target seats alongside the overall campaign efforts, plus a dummy variable 
capturing the target status of a seat. 9  The model was run without controls, and then 
controlling for notional turnout in 2005. The results help explain the outcomes in Tables 3 
and 4. First, there is no effect of targeting on Liberal Democrat campaigning’s impact on 
turnout, with the interaction term failing to reach statistical significance. Second, the results 
for the Conservatives similarly suggest that targeting also had a minimal effect. Labour’s 
results, however, are different. In both models, there is apparently a negative impact on 
turnout as a result of Labour campaigning in non-target seats. However, in target seats (145 
in total) this negative effect was attenuated, even though overall turnout was lower in these 
seats.10  
 
Table 5. The Impact of Targeting on Turnout Using Candidate Spending  
 
 Without Controls With Notional Turnout 2005 
 B  S.E.  Sig  B  S.E.  Sig  
Constant  62.723 .467 ** 26.562 1.496 ** 
Conservative  .125 .010 ** .051 .008 ** 
Labour  -.131 .014 ** -.035 .011 ** 
Lib Dems  .046 .013 ** .043 .009 ** 
Con Target  5.431 1.421 ** 1.734 1.014 n.s. 
Lab Target  -1.988 1.192 n.s. -1.043 .843 n.s. 
Lib Dem Target  -1.689 1.664 n.s. -.898 1.175 n.s. 
Con Spend * Target  -.119 .022 ** -.040 .016 ** 
Lab Spend * Target  .120 .024 ** .043 .017 ** 
Lib Dem Spend * Target  .000 .028 n.s. -.021 .020 n.s. 
Notional Turnout 2005 N/A   .607 .024 ** 
Adj. R
2 
   .339   .671 
n    619   619 
 
** p <0.01 * p <0.05 
                                                          
9
  Information on which seats were targeted by parties was gathered through qualitative interviews with national party staff 
(Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a) 
10
   To guard against any issues of collinearity that could occur given that most seats will be targeted by more than one party, 
these models were also run with results from each single party alone. The results were identical. 
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The apparent differential effects of Labour’s campaigns are confirmed re-running the model 
using combined campaign spending for candidates from the three principal parties and 
create an interaction term using a dummy variable capturing whether or not two or more 
parties from amongst the principal three targeted the seat. The model is run controlling for 
notional turnout in 2005 and Table 6 shows that, overall, targeting did not have the effect of 
depressing turnout overall, despite the potential for this to occur under first past the post. 
 
Table 6. The Impact of Targeting on Turnout Using Combined Levels of Candidate Spending 
  
 B  S.E.  Sig  
Constant  22.156 1.314 ** 
Combined Parties’ Spending .019 .004 ** 
Target Seat .029 1.042 n.s. 
Party Spend * Target -.003 .008 n.s. 
Notional Turnout 2005 .681 .022 ** 
Adj. R
2 
   .646 
n    619 
 
** p <0.01 * p <0.05 
 
The interaction terms in Table 5 are easier to interpret if we produce graphical 
representations to compare the effects of different levels of candidate spending in target and 
non-target seats. We use the second model, which controls for notional turnout in 2005. In 
Figures 1, 2 and 3, we show a highly simplified scenario of turnout depending on whether 
candidates spent 25%, 50%, or 75% of the permitted maximum and the spending of the two 
other parties is held constant at 75%. In each figure there are two lines: the projected impact 
of candidate spending on turnout in a party’s target seats and the projected impact of 
spending in its non-target seats. 
 
Figure 1 shows that Conservative campaigning in both the party’s targets and its non-targets 
had a positive impact on turnout. However, in the vast majority of cases, there was a more 
positive impact on turnout in the party’s non-target seats than in its targets. Figure 3 for the 
Liberal Democrats paints a similar picture – Liberal Democrat campaigning boosted turnout 
across the board, but turnout was consistently higher in the party’s non-target seats. The 
results for Labour (Figure 2) show a different picture, however. Turnout in Labour target 
seats grew as Labour candidates campaigned more, as we would expect. However, in our 
simulation, the reverse is true in Labour’s non-target seats – turnout fell as Labour 
candidates spent more of their permitted allowance.11   Thus, Labour’s ruthless partisan 
targeting had clear effects – it significantly boosted turnout in seats Labour actively sought to 
win, but not elsewhere. Empirically, it’s true that Labour spent less in 2010 where notional 
turnout in 2005 was higher and that this could produce selection effects. However, we 
                                                          
11
  The simplified graph actually serves to exaggerate the negative effect a little as only 4% of Labour candidates in the 
party’s non-target seats actually spent 50% or more of the permitted allowance. 
Page | 12  
 
control for these by adding notional turnout in 2005 to the models and find similar results – a 
fall in turnout in Labour non-targets where candidates spent more of their permitted 
maximum. The puzzle, then, is why any form of campaigning should apparently be 
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At one level, there may be a simple, common sense explanation. It could be, for example, 
that campaigning was so poor or antagonistic to voters that they were discouraged from 
voting. Gerber & Green (2000: 660), for example, found that telephone canvassing had the 
effect of depressing turnout (though see Imai, 2005 and Gerber & Green, 2005). And, 
Whiteley et al (2013: 117) show that, unlike the other two main parties, Labour’s campaign in 
general was negatively evaluated by citizens – so that the more people were made aware of 
Labour’s campaign in a constituency the more turned-off it they became. However, given 
that Labour campaigning in its target seats was associated with higher turnout, we require 
an alternative explanation to one rooted in in the idea of antagonistic campaigning. A more 
generalizable understanding can be found if we return to the model of exogenous effects on 
campaign success developed by Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse (2011a). They highlight a series 
of conditions to estimate the relative effectiveness of parties’ campaign efforts (see Table 7 
below). 
 
Table 7. Exogenous factors influencing likely effectiveness of constituency campaigns 
   
 More Effective Less Effective 
Closeness of Election Popularity Equilibrium Unpopular party(ies) 
Significant change likely Challenger(s)   Incumbent  
High No’s of Target seats Unpopular party(ies) Popularity Equilibrium 
Central Management Clear objectives Unclear objectives 
 
For Labour, two particular conditions were pertinent in respect of turnout – the party’s 
relative unpopularity in 2010 and the likelihood of significant change at the election. Both 
conditions were likely to limit the effects of Labour campaigning as the unpopular incumbent. 
Certainly, research using experimental methods has also shown that campaign interventions 
are affected by the level of popularity of the party (Niven, 2001; Hillygus, 2005; Arceneaux 
and Nickerson, 2009).  Equally, Karp et al (2007:95-6) suggest that where parties are not in 
a competitive position, they may find it difficult to persuade potential voters to go to the polls, 
since their votes may be perceived as making little difference to the outcome. They also note 
that some voters are likely to be easier to contact than others, with previous voters the most 
cost-effective for parties to contact. Such conditions were particularly pertinent to Labour in 
2010. As an unpopular incumbent, its campaigns in its non-target seats would probably only 
be focussed on either existing Labour supporters or past Labour voters, since the chances of 
capturing new voters in these seats would be minimal; survey evidence shows that the 
parties canvassing efforts in the last few months of the campaign focus on their ‘known’ 
supporters and avoid mobilising their opponents’ probable and possible voters (Johnston et 
al, 2012). However, at the individual level, we find that previous Labour voters and partisans 
were significantly more likely to abstain in 2010 compared with those of the other main 
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parties. Denver, Carman & Johns (2012: 18) show that whereas 6% of both Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat voters in 2005 abstained in 2010, the comparable figure for Labour 
was 11%. Equally, if we compare abstention rates of those with partisan identification in 
2010, we find that 11% of Labour partisans abstained, while the same was true for only 4% 
of Conservatives and 6% of Liberal Democrats (the differences being statistically significant) 
(British Election Study, 2010).  
 
The general explanation, therefore, is related to underlying factors exogenous to campaigns: 
Labour was the unpopular incumbent at an election where significant change was likely. 
Under these circumstances, the Labour campaign was only likely to mobilize Labour 
supporters in Labour’s non-target seats and Labour supporters were more likely to abstain. 
Such a finding is theoretically important, since it demonstrates not only that campaigning will 
not have uniform effects, but that it can be associated with negative effects, not so much 
because the campaign actual discourages participation, but because the circumstances are 
such that in some seats, the campaign will only appeal to a group of voters who are 
disproportionately more likely to abstain. 
 
So, Labour’s ruthless targeting and the exogenous effects of being an unpopular incumbent 
may help to explain the significant differentiation in turnout effects between Labour target 
and non-target seats. However, one further puzzle is why there was not a similarly stark 
differentiation between the effects as a result of Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
campaigning in those parties’ target and non-target seats. Certainly, the Liberal Democrats 
were relatively popular and while the Conservatives were not themselves overwhelming 
popular they were, nevertheless, more popular than Labour (Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 
2011a). So, if this was only a function of popularity, then we would expect the impact of 
campaigning on turnout in those parties’ targets to be higher than in their non-targets. But by 
and large, that is not the case (and in the case of the Liberal Democrats, turnout in non-
targets was consistently higher). The explanation for this may again be related to the 
exogenous factors highlighted by Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse (2011a) – the high number of 
target seats combined with less focussed variation in partisan targeting by the Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats. Certainly, analyses of electoral payoffs suggest that these two 




Studies of district-level (constituency) campaigning in Britain have identified two important 
trends. First effective partisan targeting is a core component of a successful constituency-
level campaign strategy in terms of delivering electoral payoffs so that, over time, political 
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parties have become better at raising and targeting resources where they are needed most. 
While improvements in targeting have helped ensure that all three principal parties’ 
campaigns have delivered electoral payoffs, a question has arisen as to whether 
increasingly ruthless, partisan-focused targeting by parties could impact upon overall levels 
of turnout, the reasoning being that the positive effects of campaigning on voter mobilization 
might only be apparent in a minority of seats. Second, they have shown how campaign 
techniques are continuously modernising but that, despite these changes, more traditional, 
labour-intensive campaigning tends to produce greater electoral payoffs, while noting that as 
more modern techniques become widespread, voters are becoming more receptive to them 
(Fisher & Denver, 2009). Similar citizen preferences for more traditional campaign methods 
(in particular, face-to-face) have been found in other democracies (Gerber & Green, 2000; 
Aldrich et al, 2013), though few suggest, as Fisher & Denver (2009) do, that responsiveness 
may grow with familiarity (though see Imai, 2005, who similarly suggests that techniques 
such as phone calls may produce positive results, and Aldrich et al, 2013, who show US 
citizens are increasingly comfortable with online contact). 
 
This article addressed three questions. The first was whether combined levels of campaign 
effort continued to mobilize voters and the evidence was clear: in aggregate terms, more 
intense constituency-level campaigns boosted turnout overall in 2010 – the campaigns 
mobilized voters. The second question was whether the differing forms of campaigns that 
parties now employ had any differential impact on turnout. The evidence suggested that, in 
line with studies of different campaign techniques on electoral payoffs, more traditional 
campaigning was associated with higher levels of turnout as well. Moreover, as suggested 
by Fisher & Denver (2009), voters are becoming more receptive to modern campaign 
techniques and by 2010 it appears that their use also had a positive impact on voter turnout. 
With the newest campaign development of e-campaigning, however, there is at present no 
evidence of a positive impact on turnout. As Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse (2011b) suggest, 
despite the hyperbole surrounding the use of e-campaigning in 2010, the reality was that its 
electoral effects are currently minimal compared with more established practices. 
 
The final question asked whether individual parties’ campaigns boosted turnout to similar 
degrees. The evidence suggested that while both Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
campaigns were associated with higher levels of turnout, the same was not true for Labour’s, 
which was poorly resourced compared to the Conservatives. Such findings brought us back 
to our initial concern of whether their targeting strategies, while delivering electoral payoffs 
for the parties themselves, could have the impact of depressing turnout overall through a 
lack of mobilization in the majority of seats. Although this was not the case for combined 
levels of campaigning, it appeared to be so for Labour campaigns which boosted turnout in 
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the party’s target seats, but not elsewhere – thus at best contributing no positive effect on 
levels of turnout overall. In one sense, such a finding may be cause for concern. Labour has 
for some elections been effective in its partisan targeting, so the effects identified here are 
not surprising. The Conservatives should eventually become as effective (and indeed, there 
are signs that they are ‘catching up’ with Labour) and if that occurs (and Labour continues to 
be effective in its targeting), the likely effect may be a decline in turnout overall. However, we 
find that the marked difference in the impact of Labour campaigning on turnout in its target 
and non-target seats is best explained through reference to Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse’s 
model of likely campaign effectiveness. Thus the impact of party campaigning on turnout is 
likely to vary by party over time, with significant intervening variables being the level of 
popularity of the party and whether they are the incumbent or challenger. Where a party is 
unpopular, the variation in impact through targeting is likely to be greater, since in non-target 
seats campaigns will be focussed principally on the party’s core vote. And, if that party’s 
supporters are disproportionately likely to abstain rather than vote for one of the other 
parties, the outcome in such seats is likely to be a fall in turnout overall. The overall 
message is clear – campaigning boosts turnout. The key concern becomes one of where 
that campaigning takes place and under what exogenous circumstances. The impact of 
campaigning is far from uniform and strongly influenced by electoral context, suggesting that 
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Appendix 
Calculation of Campaign Intensity Index 
Responses to the questions below are grouped into the following core components of constituency 
campaigning: Preparation, Organisation, Manpower, Computers, Polling Day Activity, Telephones, 
Direct Mail, Canvassing, Leaflets and E-Campaigning. These groups are then entered into a Principal 
Components Analysis, which produced one component. 
 
Group   Question 
 
Preparation How prepared - Jobs 
Preparation How prepared - Campaign funds 
Preparation How prepared - Main committee rooms 
Preparation How prepared - Local committee rooms 
Preparation How prepared - Electoral register 
Preparation How prepared - Election address 
Preparation How prepared - Printing 
Preparation How prepared - Identifying supporters 
Preparation Started serious planning 
Preparation Use of previous canvass records 
Organization Percentage of const covered by active local orgs 
Organization How long ago knew responsible 
Organization Delegated duties - Canvassing organiser 
Organization Delegated duties - Postal votes 
Organization Delegated duties - Candidate aide 
Organization Delegated duties - Computer officer 
Organization Local organisers or sub-agents 
Manpower Number of campaign workers 
Manpower Number of campaign helpers on polling day 
Computers Delegated duties - Computer officer 
Computers Use of computers - Direct mail 
Computers Use of computers - Canvass returns 
Computers Use computerised electoral register 
Computers Computers used to compile knock-up lists 
Computers Election software provided by party HQ 
Polling Day Activity Good morning leaflets delivered 
Polling Day Activity Voters knocked up on polling day 
Polling Day Activity Percentage of constituency covered 
Polling Day Activity Number of campaign helpers on polling day 
Polling Day Activity Volunteers sent into your constituency 
Telephones Use telephone canvassing in const 
Telephones Outside canvassing 
Telephones Use telephone canvassing 
Telephones Telephone canvassing organised from outside constituency 
Telephones Voters contacted by telephone on polling day 
Direct Mail Leaflets targeted at particular groups 
Direct Mail Direct mail used to target individual voters 
Canvassing Percentage of electorate canvassed 
Canvassing Percentage of electorate telephone canvassed? 
Leaflets How many regionally/nationally produced leaflets distributed 
Leaflets Total number of locally produced leaflets 
E-Campaigning Pre-election campaign - Operating and maintaining a website 
E-Campaigning Pre-election campaign - Using social networking sites 
E-Campaigning Contact voters in the constituency by text message 
E-Campaigning Make use of Twitter to communicate with voters 
E-Campaigning Use of computers - Emailing voters 
E-Campaigning Local party & candidate website 
E-Campaigning Campaign effort - Maintaining website 
E-Campaigning Campaign effort - Emailing voters 
E-Campaigning Campaign effort - Social networking sites  
E-Campaigning Campaign effort - Video/image sharing sites  
E-Campaigning Voters contacted by text on polling day 
E-Campaigning Voters contacted by email on polling day 
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Calculation of Other Indexes 
Responses to the questions below were included in the calculation of the following scales: 
 
Traditionalism 
 No. of posters distributed 
 No. of nationally or regionally produced leaflets distributed 
 No. of locally produced leaflets distributed 
 Percentage of electorate canvassed on doorstep 
 No. of campaign workers 
 Knocked up by party workers 
 No. of polling day workers 
 
Modernisation 
 Amount of direct mail sent 
 Percentage of electorate telephone canvassed 
 Used computers 
 Had computerised electoral register 
 Used party software 
 With website 
 Knocked-up by telephone 
 Used computers for knocking-up lists 
 
E-Campaigning 
 Pre-election campaign - Operating and maintaining a website 
 Pre-election campaign - Using social networking sites 
 Contact voters in the constituency by text message 
 Make use of Twitter to communicate with voters 
 Use of computers - Emailing voters 
 Local party & candidate website 
 Campaign effort - Maintaining website 
 Campaign effort - Emailing voters 
 Campaign effort - Social networking sites  
 Campaign effort - Video/image sharing sites  
 Voters contacted by text on polling day 
 Voters contacted by email on polling day 
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